The responding officer entered a walkway within the apartment and noticed the youth, approximately 5 feet from him, lying prone on the floor of a corridor with his arms extended in front of him. Immediately, and without any warning, the youth jumped up, ran toward the officer, and began flailing his arms. Unknown to the responding officer at that moment, the youth actually was stabbing him in the arm, chest, and stomach areas with a dagger. Hitting the officer’s protective vest, the youth continued to move the weapon lower until he struck below the vest.

     At this point, the responding officer, realizing that he was being stabbed, pulled his service weapon and attempted to fire. When the gun did not fire, the officer believed that it malfunctioned and pulled the trigger again, wounding the youth in the arm. (The officer learned later that his gun functioned well. The reason that he could not pull the trigger the first time was due to temporary muscle and nerve damage from the stab wounds.) When the off-duty officer heard the shot, he ran toward the sound of the gunfire. As he approached the doorway, the youth fled the building, stabbing the off-duty officer in his side. At this point, the security officer approached the area and saw the youth running from the scene. After chasing the youth into the nearby woods, the security officer ended the pursuit. A neighbor, hearing the gunfire and seeing that two of the officers were wounded, called for emergency assistance.

     After sending search dogs into the woods, backup officers apprehended the youth approximately 1 ¹ / ₂ hours later. The youth, who had wounded two officers with a dagger and eluded a third officer, turned out to be the same teenage prowler reported earlier that evening.

CASE ANALYSIS

     Although it remains both easy and frequently unfair to judge law enforcement officers’ actions, constructively reviewing such incidents can assist in preventing future injuries and deaths. In the case study, what did the officers do right? Could they have done something differently? Does it appear that the officers made certain assumptions about the nature of the call for service, the suspect, or each other’s actions? How did these assumptions affect their decisions to act? What plan or approach did the officers exhibit? How did the officers communicate with each other? Was the communication effective?

     Officers continually need to remind themselves that, when entering the killing zone, they must become exceedingly aware of the increased possibility of injury to themselves. For example, from 1990 to 1999, nearly 75 percent of officers feloniously killed died within that 10-foot radius of the offender.² While officers obviously must enter this killing zone to apprehend individuals, they need to realize that they may be reacting too quickly, misreading behaviors or actions of offenders, or missing danger signs or signals that offenders may send unintentionally. Training should prepare officers to react appropriately and safely when they must take immediate action in a situation that necessarily brings them into the killing zone. Realistic and practical exercises can instill in officers the skills and mental preparedness that they can call on automatically when confronting offenders. Law enforcement agencies should ensure that officers receive training in such critical issues as formulating action plans, following established policies, knowing their physical and mental conditions, remaining aware of their surroundings, considering offender reactions, and exploring tactical options.

Plan of Action

     Has training made officers consider formulating a plan of action, rather than simply reacting to the behavior of offenders? As officers respond to calls for service or initiate chases, do they consider various situations that they might face? How will they deal with these? If officers receive practical and realistic training, they will run less risk of being surprised and easily taken advantage of. For example, an offender may lead an officer into a tunnel area, where no opportunity for cover exists, so that the offender can suddenly turn and attack. In such cases, officers should run parallel to offenders, not follow the same path, so that offenders planning an attack will not know the exact location of the officers.

     The complainants in the case study described the youth to the responding officer as young, wearing only a T-shirt, sneakers, and tan pants. The description fits many teenagers—most of whom are neither criminals nor dangerous. Could someone so described harm an officer? After years of encountering thousands of teenagers who have not presented a physical threat, perhaps the responding officer made assumptions that almost cost him his life. Even in situations that appear non threatening and mundane, officers must consider “what if” circumstances to provide them with options for reacting to surprising occurrences.

Foot Pursuit Policy

     Law enforcement agencies should realize that developing a foot pursuit policy not only enhances officer safety but decreases the chances that a mishandled foot pursuit will develop into a possible use of deadly force situation.³ In the interest of officer safety, agencies should consider policies that address foot pursuits while officers are alone or those occurring under specific circumstances, such as when—

     In the case study, when the security officer initiated a foot pursuit, the youth already had seriously cut the responding officer and stabbed the off-duty officer. What options did the security officer have? Was he knowledgeable of the surroundings? Was he as knowledgeable of the surroundings as the youth? Could the youth have planned an ambush? Could other youths have been awaiting their arrival? Not knowing the youth’s intentions, the security officer wisely halted the chase and waited for backup.

Officer’s Condition

     Is the officer prepared to subdue an offender after a prolonged chase? What is the officer’s present physical condition? Could the offender intend to run the officer into exhaustion to give the offender the upper hand? Is the officer under excessive amounts of stress, including personal or professional issues, that could cause possible distractions?

     Experienced officers recognize that if they are not in good physical shape, a pursuit, especially on foot, can deplete their energy. At the point of physical contact, the officer can have a clear disadvantage, particularly in situations, such as the case study, where the suspect was young, energetic, and in excellent physical condition.

     However, officers may not realize how their emotional and psychological health can work either for or against them. Just as poor physical conditioning depletes the energy level of an officer, so do excessive amounts of stress and strain. Medical experts have demonstrated that when human organisms are under high levels of stress over extended periods of time, not only does their physical strength lessen but their cognitive abilities, such as memory, thinking, and attention, diminish. Stress not only kills physically but emotionally as well.⁴ To react appropriately under demanding and life-threatening circumstances, an officer’s physical and emotional condition prove vitally important. In the case study, if the responding officer and the off-duty officer had experienced recent major emotional conflict and crisis (at home or on the job), their abilities to accurately and quickly process information could have become impaired. This could have affected their perception as well, particularly hearing and seeing.

Knowledge of Area and Surroundings

     Is the officer aware of the surroundings as the chase begins? If not consciously aware of the surroundings, the officer can experience “tunnel vision” and lose awareness of peripheral threats, such as accomplices lurking nearby or areas with hidden pitfalls. This could lead the officer into dangerous, yet preventable, situations. For example, an offender may lead an officer intentionally around a blind corner and plan an ambush or sudden overwhelming attack or into buildings that contain prearranged traps.⁵

In the case study, due to a large volume of calls for service, the first available police unit had to respond to the call at the apartment complex, rather than the regularly assigned officer who patrols the area. The responding officer was acquainted generally with the geographical street plan, but unfamiliar with the configuration of the large apartment complexes in the area and possibly unacquainted with back alleys and side streets.

     When officers become engaged in a pursuit in unfamiliar territory, several possibilities can result. For example, they can expend as much of their energy and thoughts on trying to determine where they are as they do on keeping the suspect in sight. Or, they can place all of their time and attention on the pursuit suspect and become totally disoriented as to where they are, even unable to give the dispatcher an accurate location. Therefore, especially in unfamiliar surroundings, officers must exercise great caution to avoid being drawn into the killing zone.

Reasons for Offender’s Actions

     Considering the reasons for an offender’s actions proves paramount when those actions do not seem to fit the target crime. For example, in a traffic stop, the driver pulls to the curb and runs from the vehicle. The officer should consider the seriousness of the traffic violation and question whether a person would risk fleeing for such a minor offense. If this reaction does not make sense to the officer, perhaps it represents a clue that the driver may have committed a more serious crime.

     Even in what some consider an increasingly violent society, in the experience of many police officers throughout America, 14- or 15-year-old boys rarely stab law enforcement officers. But, as shown in the case study, this does happen. The officers did not know why the youth was on the air conditioning unit. Burglary? Peeping? Leaving his girlfriend’s residence? Running away from home? If caught by the police, how would he react? Run? Surrender? Argue? Fight? Many officers would not expect that someone so young could have warrants for several counts of attempted homicide; practice combat, hand-to-hand knife fighting regularly; or state that he would never go to prison as the youth in the case study did. What do most officers expect when they attempt to make an arrest? They need to remain vigilante and expect the unexpected, even in the most seemingly non-threatening circumstances.

Tactical Considerations

Use Verbal Commands

     Do officers consider and use verbal commands prior to and during a confrontation? For example, officer training should stress that when they catch up with an offender or the offender stops, officers should not close the distance between them immediately. Instead, they should give verbal commands to test the offender’s compliance. In cases where offenders do not comply, officers should not move closer until adequate assistance arrives on the scene.

Create Distance

     Sometimes officers should create distance between themselves and offenders, rather than moving closer. Has training taught officers to consider creating distance between themselves and the offender? Distance gives the officer increased time to react to offenders’ actions, thereby enhancing officer safety.

Contain, Not Apprehend

     Circumstances may occur when officers should contain the offender in an area, rather than rush in to apprehend. For example, an offender flees into an abandoned building with exits that the officer can view safely from the outside. If backup units are en route, the officer may want to remain outside the building until these other officers arrive on the scene. In any pursuit, officers must weigh the risks and benefits before rushing in to capture suspects. Should they attempt to gain physical control and arrest the subject immediately? Or, should they remain outside the killing zone (i.e., retreat and seek cover) until adequate assistance arrives on the scene? What are the chances that the offender may overpower the officer if the officer physically attempts to control the offender at this point? While officers must assess the situation and base their decisions on a variety of factors, the training they have received greatly impacts their decisions and, in turn, strongly affects the outcome of the incident.

Choose to Handcuff

     Sometimes circumstances merit officers holding offenders at some distance and awaiting assistance before attempting to handcuff them. Tactical considerations always result from how officers perceive the situations they encounter. Perceived reality determines tactical approach. Clearly, it proves impossible to have all tactical equipment available (e.g., high-powered firearms, less-than-lethal weapons, and riot gear) as officers encounter each pedestrian or motorist. Although they may not have tactical hardware available, officers must engage a tactical mentality at all times. Should they deploy current resources? Or, should they wait, contain the threat, and approach with backup? Should they continue to approach into the killing zone after an armed suspect who just stabbed two officers? Or, should they create some distance until the suspect complies with verbal orders? When a suspect has demonstrated well-developed marshal arts skills, with or without an additional weapon, should they attempt to place handcuffs on the subject or wait for available backup? By considering how they will respond to these types of situations before they face an actual threat, officers can improve their chances of avoiding the killing zone and still bring the offender to justice.

CONCLUSION

     Because the law enforcement profession constitutes an inherently dangerous occupation, its members must explore ways of curbing the hazards. Regular and realistic training, both at the academy and during in-services, can sharpen the skills officers need to safely effect arrests. Practical, hands-on training can encourage officers to rehearse various situations that they may encounter and experiment with different strategies that they can employ to react to them. Training should include “what if” situations and require officers to offer a number of possible solutions. Officers should develop their own “what if” scenarios that pertain to their particular patrol areas. Partners should develop and rehearse “what if” scenarios that involve their actions as partners, as well as their actions if situations require them to act alone.

     The more practical, realistic, and applied the scenarios are, the greater the likelihood that officers will rehearse them. Much like fire drills that all schoolchildren practice, the more officers rehearse, the less chance exists that they will be caught off-guard when a real emergency occurs. Safety of the officer during an arrest is not an option; it is a requirement. Officers must learn how to escape from the killing zone and, equally important, know when to avoid entering it in the first place.

Endnotes

     ¹ The authors based this article on research they are conducting currently, interviewing officers who survived attacks by offenders. For additional information on past research in this area, see Anthony J. Pinizzotto, Edward F. Davis, and Charles E. Miller, U.S. Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation, In the Line of Fire: A Study of Selected Felonious Assaults on Law Enforcement Officers (Washington, DC, 1997).

     ² Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Uniform Crime Reporting Program, Law Enforcement Officers Killed and Assaulted, 1999 (Washington, DC, 2000), 13-14.

     ³ For information on establishing a foot pursuit policy, see Shannon Bohrer, Edward F. Davis, and Thomas J. Garrity, Jr., “Establishing a Foot Pursuit Policy: Running into Danger,” FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin, May 2000, 10-15.

     ⁴ For additional information, see Arthur W. Kureczka, “Critical Incident Stress in Law Enforcement,” FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin, February/March 1996, 10-16.

⁵ Supra note 3.

Mr. Davis is an instructor in the Behavioral

Science Unit at the FBI Academy.

Dr. Pinizzotto is a clinical forensic psychologist

in the Behavioral Science Unit

at the FBI Academy.

Mr. Miller is an instructor

with the FBI’s Criminal Justice Information

Services Division in Clarksburg, West Virginia.